Northern Cyprus Legal Status

  • Non classé

This prevents the EU from using its preferred method of capacity building: twinning contracts, where partners with relevant expertise from EU countries are employed in the region. And the fact that the EU cannot work directly with the Turkish Cypriot authorities poses an even greater challenge. In addition, following the failure of the 2017 peace talks, the ad hoc committee set up to prepare Northern Cyprus for the acquis was suspended. The Greek Cypriots asserted that the work of the Committee was directly related to the « continuation of negotiations », while the Turkish Cypriot side stated that the work did not require such a precondition. Thanos Veremis and Philippos Savvides, « Cyprus after the April 24 referendum, » Cyprus Review, February 8, 2018, cyprusreview.org/index.php/cr/article/view/353. Authorities have not restricted or disrupted internet access, censored online content, and there have been no credible reports that they are monitoring private online communications without proper legal authorization. Although technological advances have improved delivery methods, journalists have reported persistent difficulties in accessing public information. No country other than the Republic of Turkey[44][49][50][51] has officially recognized Northern Cyprus as a sovereign state. The United Nations recognizes it as a territory of the Republic of Cyprus under Turkish occupation. [52] [53] [54] Pakistan and Bangladesh initially recognized it as a sovereign state shortly after Northern Cyprus` declaration of independence,[55] but they withdrew their recognition under pressure from the United States after the UN declared the declaration illegal. [56] The United Nations considers Northern Cyprus` declaration of independence to be legally invalid, as expressed in several of its resolutions. [52] [57] Apart from the talisman of recognition, it is clear that none of the governments existing on the island are qualified to claim that they are the government of the « Republic of Cyprus ».

But if the treaties and agreements of 1959-1960 cannot be legally ignored by one party in its own interest, they can certainly be replaced by the agreement of both parties on a new political order satisfactory to both parties. Thus, sovereignty would be fully and legitimately transferred to any new Cypriot Government if the successor State(s) were the product of a simultaneous exercise of self-determination by the two communities, which would replace the joint exercise of the 1960 Republic.27 The legal rights of the Turkish Cypriot community predate and manifest themselves in the proclamation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1975. The Turkish Cypriots considered it necessary « to create in their own region the legal basis for a decree leading to the establishment of the future independent Federal Republic of Cyprus » and affirmed that « their ultimate goal is to unite with the Greek Cypriot community in a bi-regional federation ». 14 It describes precisely the form of the federal system on which the leaders of the two communities, meeting under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, subsequently agreed to negotiate in their four directives of 12 February 1977. A less controversial way to change the paradigm and use EU power would be a much more ambitious agenda under the Financial Assistance Regulation to prepare Northern Cyprus for the EU acquis now. This would be done in partnership with the de facto authorities and regardless of the stage of negotiations. In other words, the EU could embark on an active programme to Europeanise Northern Cyprus` legislation and standards and work as much as possible with the current authorities to build a European reality in an unrecognised state. The formal adoption of the acquis communautaire would be the last stone in the wall. Before that, Northern Cyprus would be a de facto state closely linked to the EU. This approach would cross a Greek Cypriot red line in terms of cooperation with the de facto authorities and lead to a rethinking of its strategy towards the North.

But it would bring real benefits to the citizens of the North and would certainly give a positive impetus to the conflict resolution process. This process would facilitate the de facto convergence of the two halves of the island and would also help to prevent a much more worrying scenario for the Greek Cypriots: the de facto integration of Northern Cyprus into Turkey. Material conditions: The « Central Prison », the only prison in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, is located in the northern part of Nicosia and has a declared capacity of 311 inmates. According to the authorities, additional rooms have been converted into cells and a bunk bed system has been installed to increase the capacity to 568 people. As of September, 587 detainees and pre-trial detainees were reportedly detained. The authorities reported that at its peak during the year, the total number of prisoners and pre-trial detainees in the « central prison » reached 635. In October, there were no minors in the « central prison ». Turkey is a more active promoter of Northern Cyprus than Russia in the other two case studies. It refuses to recognise the Republic of Cyprus, which it describes as an act of solidarity. For years, Turkey has been the only outlet for Turkish Cypriots in the world. In the pre-digital world, all mail was routed to the north of the island via the address « Mersin 10 », a reference to the port opposite Cyprus on the Turkish mainland.

Direct financial assistance from Turkey financed government activities and the Turkish lira served as currency. Universities have become part of the Turkish system. The authorities did not always enforce « laws » effectively, and employers used children, mostly from Turkey, as workers, mainly with their families in agriculture, manufacturing, automotive, and construction. NGOs reported that children worked in hazardous conditions, such as on construction sites, and were exposed to heavy physical labour despite « legal » prohibitions. One NGO reported that some employers had delayed the application for work permits for seasonal workers from Turkey, thus preventing workers` children from having the right to local education. Material conditions: The only prison in the region, located in the northern part of Nicosia, has a declared capacity of 311 people. According to the authorities, additional rooms have been converted into cells and a bunk bed system has been installed, bringing the capacity of the « central prison » to 480 people. As of September, there were 528 prisoners and pre-trial detainees.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the Ombudsman reported that prison overcrowding remained a problem and that beds were crammed into the corridors of the « central prison ». The prison does not separate adults and juveniles, and there are no detention centres or penal institutions for children. Due to lack of space, remand prisoners and prisoners occupied the same cells. Entering northern Cyprus, a visitor passes through a checkpoint above which hangs a huge banner reading « TRNC forever ». However, a few days in the region confirm that the TRNC project receives little active support. The de facto authorities do not seek recognition, as in Abkhazia. Instead, the project continues by default because there are no other options. For various reasons, the « brand » of Northern Cyprus is more internationally acceptable than that of its counterparts, and several countries have adopted a pragmatic approach to the problems of the Turkish Cypriots. For example, France, Great Britain and the United States have for many years allowed Turkish Cypriots to travel abroad using TRNC passports with visas issued by consular officials based in Nicosia.

In other words, TRNC passports are accepted as travel documents, but not as identity documents issued by an official state.8 United Nations Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) states that « the attempt to establish the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is invalid and will contribute to a deterioration of the situation in Cyprus. » It added that it « considers the above-mentioned statement to be legally invalid and requests its withdrawal. » The international agreements establishing the Republic of Cyprus as a sovereign State and establishing the structure of its Government, as well as the resulting constitution, have recognized as binding the equal status of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and their equal rights to an effective role in the governance of their island and in determining their political future. At the beginning of the negotiations that led to the independence of Cyprus, the British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, stated: « His Majesty`s Government will intend to ensure that any exercise of self-determination is carried out in such a way that the Turkish Cypriot community, as well as the Greek Cypriot community, is free, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, to decide for itself on its future status. 4 Consequently, all these documents recognised the right of both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to determine their political future and undertook to exercise those rights jointly in order to create a single State governing the entire territory and peoples of Cyprus.